Objective: Since the enactment of the Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999, the Memorial Hermann Hospital Medical Appropriateness Review Committee (MARC) MARC reviewed six cases of children in the first year of life, three from the Neonatal ICU and three from the Pediatric ICU. We aimed to describe the characteristics of these patients and the role of the MARC in this process.
Introduction
Intractable disputes sometimes arise between physicians and families regarding aggressive life-sustaining interventions that the physician believes are medically inappropriate. Modern advances in patient care have created more opportunities for such disputes, but there is no uniform agreement how best to resolve these conflicts. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] The State of Texas addressed issues of medical futility through the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA), which is unique in state law. TADA took effect in 1999, after being signed into law by then Governor George W Bush. 10 The primary focus of TADA lay in codifying Advance Directives and assuring that patients were not being treated against their expressed wishes. In addition, TADA addressed 'medically inappropriate treatment', allowing medical professionals to discontinue inappropriate life sustaining treatments, even when the patient or patient's surrogate decision maker requests otherwise. 8, 9 TADA requires the physician to follow a defined protocol that formally involves the family or other surrogate decision maker at multiple steps (Table 1) .
Memorial Hermann Hospital implemented the TADA provisions with additional protections beyond those required by statute. These extensions included establishment of a Medical Appropriateness Review Committee (MARC) separate from the Institutional Ethics Committee (IEC), with separate written policies and procedures.
In infants, where the wishes and values of the patient are not known, issues of futility and medically inappropriate care may be even more complex than in adults. [11] [12] [13] [14] Our goal is to present the cases of infants in the first year of life that were reviewed by the MARC over a 6-year period.
Methods
We received approval from the Committee for the protection of human subjects to examine retrospectively the records of patients previously reviewed by the MARC. We reviewed all MARC cases from 1999 to 2005 of patients within their first year of life. The authors were all members of the Institutional Ethics Committee. The authors did not provide direct care to these infants at the time the cases were reviewed by the MARC. A single author reviewed the cases (EBE). Two of the authors (EBE, JWS) provided care to some of the neonates at other times during their hospital course. These authors (EBE, JWS) did not participate in the MARC reviews of any cases in which they had delivered direct patient care.
Results
Since the enactment of the TADA, from 1999 to 2005, six cases were reviewed by the MARC, which involved children in the first year of life ( Table 2) . Three of the cases were from the NICU and three were from the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit. Four of the cases were male and two were female. One of the infants was Hispanic, and five were black. All of the infants were funded with Medicaid.
All of the patients required life-sustaining therapy, and all patients required mechanical ventilation. The MARC determined that care was not inappropriate in two cases; both infants died on full support after the MARC review. The MARC determined care to be inappropriate in four cases. Of these, one patient was successfully transferred to another hospital during the 10-day waiting period and one patient died during the 10-day waiting period. Two patients died after the 10-day waiting period, shortly after withdrawal of life sustaining treatments, without agreement of their parents.
Cases 1, 2 and 3 had conditions that were each the result of well-described, heritable abnormalities known to be lethal in infancy. The chromosomal abnormality in case 6 was not previously described, and it was uncertain what effect this genetic abnormality had on his condition. Four of the six cases had severe neurological conditions with a firm prognosis for severe neurological impairment available to the MARC review. Three of the patients were fed through a gastrostomy tube.
The MARC process includes discussions with parents regarding their beliefs about continuing life-sustaining treatment, which are recorded in the proceedings. Parental reasons for not stopping life sustaining treatment included religious beliefs in two cases, disagreement about prognosis given by physicians in five of the cases and parental unwillingness to concur in two cases. Several parents had differing prognostic expectations than those of the physicians. One parent was quoted in the record of the MARC as saying, 'I want her to go home and get well.' Another parent's response was, '(my child) has been through too much to stop now. ' In one of the cases where treatment was not determined to be medically inappropriate, there had been three separate informal ethics consults called by members of the medical and nursing staff, over the course of several months, due to concerns of patient suffering.
Discussion
Review of these six cases leads to several conclusions. First, this procedure has been rarely invoked. For the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, only three patients were reviewed in 6 years. For the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit, three patients were reviewed in 6 years. Second, while major concern has been expressed regarding 1. The family must be given written information about hospital policy on the ethics consultation process
1. There must be a formal ethics consultation before the MARC is convened 2. The family must be given 48 h notice and be invited to participate in the consultation process 2. The family may be provided with a second opinion, and patient representation as needed 3. The Ethics Committee must provide a written report detailing its findings to the family 3. The family is provided with the Ethics committee findings, as well as a written report from the MARC 4. If the Ethics Consultation Process fails to resolve the dispute, the hospital, working with the family, must try to arrange transfer of the patient to another physician or institution willing to give the treatment requested by the family 4. The hospital has dedicated significant resources to helping arrange possible transfer 5. If, after 10 days, no such provider can be found, the hospital and physician may unilaterally withhold or withdraw care that has been determined to be futile 5. The hospital provides some flexibility in extending beyond 10 days, depending on circumstances, such as reasonable chance of transfer requiring more than 10 days to arrange, holidays, important family events, etc. 6. The patient or surrogate may ask a state court to grant an extension of time before treatment is withdrawn 7. If the family does not seek an extension, or the judge fails to grant one, futile treatment may be unilaterally withdrawn by the treatment team, with immunity from civil and criminal prosecution
Modified from Fine and Mayo. 8 discontinuance of support without concurrence of the family, this outcome occurred in less than half of the cases. Third, all cases were brought before the MARC because of documented concern that the treatments were not only ineffective but also were causing harm to the patient. There was no evidence that other considerations such as insurance status, socioeconomic status, race, or gender played any role in bringing the cases to the MARC, or in the resulting decision of the MARC. Fourth, the process was invoked only in infants who were thought to be imminently dying.
Of the six infants reviewed, five died in the hospital before discharge. Fifth, the process appears to have required a very high degree of certainty regarding prognosis to withdraw care. In case 6, where a new genetic abnormality was noted without clear prognosis, care was continued despite other overwhelming medical issues, from which the infant later died. Sixth, the transfer process can actually result in an amicable solution between the family and the caregivers, as demonstrated by Case 4. Finally, there might be concern that the MARC, as a creature of the hospital and the medical staff, might be biased towards supporting the medical establishment as represented by the attending physician or the hospital. 15 In two of the six cases, the MARC did not unanimously support the opinion of the attending physician and instead ordered that full support be continued. We believe that the MARC served as an independent body.
A stated goal of the TADA was to protect the rights of patients, by preventing patients from being kept alive against their will, generally evidenced by an Advance Directive. At the same time, TADA also recognized the professional and institutional integrity of healthcare workers and hospitals. Under carefully specified conditions, this Act provided permitted withdrawal of inappropriate life-sustaining treatment, even if the patient or family of the patient did not agree. TADA chose the syntax of 'medically inappropriate,' rather than 'futile', supporting the stance that these issues are fundamentally medical decisions, and should be made by medical professionals. [8] [9] [10] TADA created a unique process for physicians, hospitals, patients and their surrogates to resolve conflict. The statutory process has been summarized elsewhere, and is presented in Table 1 . This process requires formal advance notification of the family and thorough discussion by a hospital committee. If care is determined to be inappropriate, there is a requirement for an attempt to transfer within 10 days. If the 10-day period ends without transfer of the patient, the physician may discontinue the inappropriate treatment with immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. [8] [9] [10] In response to TADA, Memorial Hermann Hospital developed policies to provide families with additional support, beyond that required by statute (Tables 1 and 3) . First, before the case can go before the MARC, the responsible physician must document in the chart careful discussions with the patient or surrogate regarding the nature of the patient's ailment, the options for treatment, the prognosis and the reasons why the physician considers the requested intervention or treatment to be medically inappropriate. The family is also given the option of obtaining an independent medical opinion from a physician of their choice, for which Memorial Hermann Hospital agrees to be financially responsible. If an agreement cannot be reached after reasonable effort by the attending physician, the attending physician must seek a second medical opinion from a qualified physician. If the second opinion agrees that the intervention or treatment is medically inappropriate, the attending physician can present the case to the MARC for review. In combination, these extensions foster careful consideration of the medical facts and circumstances. Several recent cases have focused attention on issues of medical futility in Texas. Truog 15 calls attention to the importance of communication in these cases. We note that the Memorial Hermann Hospital extensions to the mandated process have the effect of improving and formalizing communication. Truog has also raised the 'due-process' approach, with the judicial system as its gold standard. While the transparency of the public arena may be useful for broader discussion, we believe that the intensely personal nature of these sensitive issues is best addressed in the privacy of the clinical setting.
In infants, issues of medically inappropriate care may be even more complex than in adults, because autonomy is dependent upon knowing the wishes of the patient. For an adult patient, autonomy may be honored based on prior dialogue or written directives of the patient. However, infants cannot express their own wishes, and therefore, surrogates must make decisions based on the best interests of the infant. 13, 16 Surrogate adults frequently assume the infant's values and wishes to be the same as their own, while ethicists may argue the infant's wishes are better described as unknown. 2,17 -19 In addition, there has been historical public concern that there may be an unstated bias against handicapped infants in decisions regarding life-sustaining treatments. This was first noted in 1973, when Duff and Campbell 20 reported significantly higher mortality rates in infants predicted to have serious handicap. This was followed in 1982, with the famous 'Baby Doe' case of a newborn with Down Syndrome, who died of surgically correctable duodenal atresia within a few days of life. This widely publicized case led to unprecedented governmental regulation in the provision of lifesustaining treatments to infants, known as the Baby Doe Rules. 13, 14 The US Supreme Court struck down these rules in 1986. However, by that time Congress had passed the Child Abuse and Treatment Act of 1984 (CATA), which defines specific conditions for withdrawal of life sustaining treatment in infants. 19 In each of the six cases reviewed here, the MARC process demonstrated concern by caregivers both for futility of treatment and that continuation of treatment would be inhumane, two of the criteria defined under CATA.
These six cases provide actual data in infants on the use of TADA and the extended MARC process at Memorial Hermann Hospital. We agree that a major part of the solution to these conflicts lies in improved communication. However, it can be difficult to reconcile continuation of a patient's suffering with the time and process necessary for resolution of these issues. We believe that TADA and MARC provide the necessary 'due process' for resolving these conflicts and that the Memorial Hermann Hospital extensions to TADA promote communication and provide additional protections to the patients, families, physicians and staff. 
